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Abstract: We review existing estimates of the size of the Spanish underground economy, 
apply the Ahumada et al. (2007, RIW) correction procedure to some of them and calculate the 
size of the underground economy in Spain for the period 1960 through 2009 by using the 
modified-cash-deposits-ratio (MCDR) approach recently developed by Pickhardt and Sardà 
(2011, EJLE). We then extend the MCDR approach with respect to an analysis of the causes 
of the Spanish underground economy. Contrary to most other studies, we show that the latter 
is not predominantly caused by tax pressure, but by labor market aspects, macroeconomic 
influences and criminal activities. Based on these findings we derive some unprecedented 
policy recommendations. 
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Size and causes of the underground economy in Spain: 
A correction of the record and new evidence from the MCDR approach 
 
 
1  Introduction  
The size, scope and impact of the underground economy
1 are among the top issues of the 
political and economic policy debates in Spain. Although these debates are fuelled by the 
current  economic  situation  of  Spain,  the  day  to  day  presence  of  underground  economy 
activities in most people’s social environment also contributes to an increasing awareness.   
From a scientific point of view, however, any analysis of the size, scope and impact of the 
underground economy is faced with severe data problems because underground activities are 
not  recorded  and  anyone  engaged  in  such  activities  has  a  strong  incentive  to  hide  them. 
Therefore,  economists  have  developed  a  variety  of  methods  to  estimate  the  size  of  the 
underground  economy  and  some  of  them  are  discussed  in  Schneider  and  Enste  (2000), 
Kazemier (2006), Pickhardt and Shinnick (2008) or Adair (2011). 
Yet,  the  most  frequently  applied  approaches,  the  Multiple-Indicators-Multiple-Causes 
(MIMIC) method and the currency demand method (the latter is often used as an input for the 
MIMIC approach, see Giles 1999), have been heavily criticized on econometric grounds by 
Breusch  (2005a,b,c,d).  In  addition,  Ahumada  et  al.  (2007)  have  shown  that  the  currency 
demand method produces coherent estimates only if the long run income elasticity of the 
demand for currency is equal to unity. A condition that is not fulfilled for various published 
estimates. Moreover, Ahumada et al. (2008) have shown that if the lagged dependent variable 
is  used  in  currency  demand  estimations,  calculating  cardinal  values  of  the  size  of  the 
underground economy requires a known initial value of the size of the underground economy. 
Again, in a number of relevant published estimates no such initial value was used. To this 
                                                 
1  We  use  the  term  ‘underground  economy’  interchangeably  with  terms  such  as  shadow  economy,  hidden 
economy, black economy, etc. (see Kazemier 2006, Pickhardt and Sardà 2011). 3 
 
extent, many estimates of the size of the underground economy have produced faulty figures 
and, therefore, have provided misleading information to the public, to politicians and law 
makers.  
The purpose of this paper is to address this issue in three ways. First, we review existing 
estimates of the size of the Spanish underground economy. Second, we apply the Ahumada et 
al.  (2007)  correction  to  relevant  estimates.  Third,  we  apply  a  rather  simple  calculation 
method, the modified-cash-deposits-ratio (MCDR) approach, which was recently developed 
by  Pickhardt  and  Sardà  (2011)  and  which  is  not  subject  to  the  critique  of  Breusch 
(2005a,b,c,d) and Ahumada et al. (2008, 2007). Moreover, we extend the MCDR approach by 
incorporating an analysis of possible causes of underground economy activities.  Among other 
things, we show that the MCDR approach allows for reproducing various existing estimates 
of the Spanish underground economy, that some previously published estimates are untenable 
with respect to the size of the latter and/or its evolution over time, and that the Spanish 
underground  economy  is  predominantly  caused  by  labor  market  aspects,  macroeconomic 
issues and illicit activities, rather than just by tax pressure. These findings allow us to draw 
some  comprehensive  and  unprecedented  policy  conclusions  for  combating  the  Spanish 
underground economy.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we deal with the size of the Spanish 
underground economy. First, we briefly review previous estimations. We then employ the 
Ahumada et al. (2007) correction procedure to some of these estimates. Eventually, we use 
the MCDR approach for calculating the size of the Spanish underground economy. In section 
three we compare and contrast our findings with previous estimates, provide an analysis of 
possible  causes  of  the  Spanish  underground  economy  and  offer  some  policy 





2  Size and Evolution of the Spanish Underground Economy  
Estimates of the size of the underground economy in Spain have been conducted since the 
1980s by various researchers. However, almost all of them have used the monetary approach 
in one way or another. The latter is an indirect macro-based method that rests on the quantity 
theory of money and was pioneered by Cagan (1958). Two decades later, Gutmann (1977) 
developed a simple non-econometric calculation procedure based on the monetary approach 
and applied it to U.S. data. In contrast, Feige (1979), Klovland (1980, 1984), Tanzi (1980, 
1982,  1983),  Bhattacharyya  (1990),  and  Escobedo  and  Mauleón  (1991)  have  developed 
variants of the monetary approach that are all based on an econometrically estimated money 
demand  equation.  Therefore,  these  variants  of  the  monetary  method  are  also  known  as 
variants of the currency or money demand method. 
Moreover, as noted, results derived from a monetary method are often used as a calibration 
input for MIMIC estimations. This is because the MIMIC method, which was first applied to 
underground economy estimations by Frey and Weck (1983), just generates relative estimates, 
so that the MIMIC index must be calibrated with a benchmark value taken from another 
source in order to get cardinal values of the size of the underground economy (e.g. see Giles 
1999, F373; Schneider and Enste 2000). Apart from the monetary approach and the MIMIC 
approach,  there  are  a  number  of  alternative  methods  for  estimating  the  size  of  the 
underground economy, which are reviewed, among others, by Schneider and Enste (2000), 
Kazemier (2006) or Adair (2011).  
 
2.1  Previous Estimates 
The first estimates of the Spanish underground economy were conducted by Lafuente Félez 
(1980), using the Tanzi method and by Moltó Calvo (1980), using the Gutmann method. 
However, both authors derive a percentage value of its size for just one year, 22.9 percent 5 
 
(1978) and one percent (1976), respectively. Several other authors have also contributed some 
evidence for selected years (see Table 1, column Var.).  
A time series of the size of the Spanish underground economy is provided by several 
authors  who  use  different  variants  of  the  monetary  method.  For  example,  Escobedo  and 
Mauleón (1991), Mauleón and Sardà (1997), Gómez-Antonio and Alañón-Pardo (2004), and 
Arrazola  et  al.  (2011)  all  apply  the  Escobedo  and  Mauleón  (1991)  method.  The  MIMIC 
approach is used by Alañón-Pardo and Gómez-Antonio (2005), who calibrate their MIMIC 
model  with  the  1980  value  and  the  1980-1981  growth  rate  of  the  underground  economy 
according to Gómez-Antonio and Alañón-Pardo (2004). Dell’Anno et al. (2007), essentially 
do the same because they also calibrate their MIMIC model with a 1980 value taken from 
Alañón-Pardo  and  Gómez-Antonio  (2005)  or  Gómez-Antonio  and  Alañón-Pardo  (2004). 
Moreover,  Weck-Hannemann  et  al.  (1984),  Schneider  (1997a,b,  2010)  and  Feld  and 
Schneider (2010) also provide results for selected years based on a MIMIC model, which is 
calibrated with values taken from a currency demand method. In contrast, Prado-Domínguez 
(2004) offers a time series derived from using the Tanzi method and Gadea and Serrano-Sanz 
(2002)  and  Serrano-Sanz  et  al.  (1998)  provide  several  time  series  that  are  based  on  the 
Klovland  (1980,  1984)  method.  Finally,  Arrazola  et  al.  (2011)  not  only  use  the  currency 
demand  method  of  Escobedo  and  Mauleón  (1991),  but  also  the  MIMIC  method  and  an 
electricity approach that is related to the method of Escobedo and Mauleón (1991).   
Hence, almost all available estimates of the size of the Spanish underground economy are 
based on a variant of the monetary approach. In Table 1, columns three to 14 (counted from 
left to right) give an overview concerning these results, where the size of the underground 
economy is measured in percent of the official GDP. Inspection of Table 1 shows that most of 
the estimates in columns three to 14 provide fairly close values in several years, but not in all 
of them. For example, during the period 1980-1989, where most of the series overlap, the size 
of the Spanish underground economy seems to have ranged basically from about five percent 6 
 
of official GDP in 1980 to about 20 percent in the late 1989, although in some years there are 
marked differences between the series. Also, during this period all estimates peak in 1989, 
except those of Mauleón and Sardà (1997) and Dell’Anno et al. (2007).  
To  explain  these  and  other  differences  in  the  results,  we  proceed  with  examining  the 
estimations in some detail. First, we consider the results in columns three to seven (EM, MS, 
GA,  A+1,  (A+2)),  which  are  all  obtained  from  a  direct  application  of  the  Escobedo  and 
Mauleón (1991) variant of the currency demand method, except the A+2 profile, which is 
obtained from an electricity demand method that is otherwise based on the Escobedo and 
Mauleón  (1991)  method.  The  main  advantage  of  the  latter  is  that  it  does  not  require  the 
assumption  of  equal  velocities  of  money  circulation  in  both  the  legal  and  underground 
economy,  an  assumption  that  is  central  to  all  other  versions  of  the  monetary  approach 
mentioned above and, in fact, one of the most heavily criticized assumptions regarding this 
approach (e.g. see Thomas 1999). The major disadvantage of this method is that it necessarily 
mimics the evolution of the tax pressure variable over time. Essentially, this means that any 
underground  economy  profile  obtained  from  applying  the  Escobedo  and  Mauleón  (1991) 
method  cannot  represent  the  evolution  of  the  underground  economy  over  time,  unless  it 
accidentally coincides exactly with the development of the tax pressure variable over time.
2 In 
fact, this may be clarified by the equation from which an absolute value of the underground 
economy is obtained (see Escobedo and Mauleón 1991, 109),  
   
YU,t = (a2 / b1) Tt,                          (1) 
 
where  YU    denotes  the  size  of  the  underground  economy  in  absolute  terms,  T  is  the  tax 
pressure variable, a2  is the coefficient of the tax pressure variable, b1 is the coefficient of the 
                                                 
2 Obviously the same is true if several pressure variables are used as this would just lead to an underground 
economy profile that represents a combination of the profiles of these pressure variables.  7 
 
legal size of the economy YL and t is the time index. However, equation (1) applies only in 
cases where cash in circulation and legal money are estimated separately. If just a single 
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where PF,t corresponds to the tax pressure variable T, α3 is the coefficient of the tax pressure 
variable and α1 is the coefficient of the legal size of the economy YL (see Mauleón and Sardà 
1997, 126; Gómez-Antonio and Alañón-Pardo 2004, 14; Alañón-Pardo and Gómez-Antonio 
2005, 1016). Hence, equations (1) and (2) make it clear that differences in the results shown 
in columns three to six of Table 1 must ceteris paribus come either from different values of 
the coefficient ratio and, thus, from running the estimation with different variables, but with 
the same tax pressure variable and/or from choosing a different tax pressure variable. Put 
differently,  if  the  tax  pressure  variable  is  the  same,  but  other  variables  in  the  estimated 
equation  differ,  ceteris  paribus  this  would  result  in  a  different  size  of  the  underground 
economy (i.e. a different ratio α3/α1), but not in a different profile over time. We will come 
back to this issue in section three.  
Next, we consider results shown in columns eight and nine of Table 1 (AG and DGA). 
These results indirectly rest on the Escobedo and Mauleón (1991) variant because they are 
both  obtained  from  calibrating  a  mimic  index  with  the  1980  value  of  column  GA.
3  This 
notwithstanding, the results in columns AG and DGA show a rather different profile and 
differ in most years, with up to 15 percentage points (see Table 1, 1997). Differences in the 
calibration procedure, underlying mimic indices and, therefore, alternative specifications of 
the MIMIC models explain these results. In this context, it seems worth noting that combining 
                                                 
3 As noted, Alañón-Pardo and Gómez de Antonio (2005, 1019) have used, in addition, the growth rate of the 
underground economy during the period 1980-1981.  8 
 
the Escobedo and Mauleón (1991) variant with a MIMIC index essentially solves the major 
problem of the former with respect to its incapacity of providing a profile that is independent 
from the profile of the tax pressure variable (see also Pickhardt and Sardà 2006).  
We now turn to columns 10 to 13 of Table 1 (P, GS1, GS2, SE+). These results all differ 
with  respect  to  the  profile  and  they  differ  substantially  with  respect  to  the  size  of  the 
underground economy, if results from the Tanzi method (column P) are compared to those 
obtained from the Klovland method (columns GS1, GS2, SE+). However, these estimates are 
subject to a recently proposed correction procedure and, therefore, we refrain from any closer 
inspection but turn to the Ahumada et al. (2007) correction procedure. 
 
2.2  Ahumada et al. Correction Procedure 
According to Ahumada et al. (2007), the currency demand method may produce coherent 
estimates provided that the long run income elasticity of the demand for currency, say β, 
equals one, β = 1.
4 This condition is an implication of the assumption of equal velocities of 
cash circulation in both the legal and underground economy. As noted, it is one of the crucial 
assumptions  on  which  the  currency  demand  method  rests  (e.g.  see  Breusch  2005b,  396), 
except the version developed by Escobedo and Mauleón (1991).  
In addition, Ahumada et al. (2007) provide a correction procedure, which can be applied if 
the long run income elasticity of the demand for currency differs from unity, β ≠ 1. In general, 
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4 The condition β = 1 is generally required, except in the rather unlikely case where the size of the underground 
economy is exactly equal to the size of the legal economy (see Ahumada et al. 2007, 367).  9 
 
where YU denotes the size of the underground economy in national currency, YL denotes the 
size of the legal economy in national currency, the ratio  L U Y / Y  denotes the faulty size of the 
underground economy, the ratio  L U Y / Y denotes the correct size of the underground economy 
and β is the long run income elasticity, which is different from unity.  
Following Ahumada et al. (2007), we choose to correct the Klovland based estimates of 
Gadea and Serrano-Sanz (2002) and Serrano-Sanz et al. (1998), which are shown in columns 
GS1, GS2 and SE+ of Table 1, respectively. The three models essentially differ with respect 
to the model specifications. The long  run income elasticity’s of the demand for  currency 
regarding these three models are, b1 = 1.68 (GS1), b2 = 0.52 (GS2) and b3 = 0.8 (SE+). Then, 
if we consider the faulty size of the underground economy in a specific year, say 1980 (see 
Table  1),  which  is  ( L U Y / Y )1  =  0.0634  in  the  case  of  (GS1),  application  of  (3)  yields: 
0.0634
(1/1.68) = 0.19362, which gives a corrected size of 19.36 percent of GDP for the Spanish 
underground economy in 1980 (see Table 1, column A-GS1). Likewise, for the second model 
we get ( L U Y / Y )2 = 0.0728, which yields: 0.0728
(1/0.52) = 0.006483, so that the corrected size 
is  0.65  percent  of  GDP  (see  Table  1,  column  A-GS2)  and  for  the  third  model  we  get 
( L U Y / Y )3 = 0.0585, which yields: 0.0585
(1/0.8) = 0.02877, so that the corrected size is 2.88 
percent of GDP (see Table 1, column A-SE+). Corrected values for the entire period are 
obtained in the same way and displayed in Table 1, columns A-GS1, A-GS2 and A-SE+, 
respectively.  
Inspection of Table 1 shows that the corrected sizes of the Spanish underground economy 
are  substantially  different  from  the  initially  published  sizes.
5  Moreover,  because  all  three 
corrected  estimations  are  also  subject  to  the  critique  of  Ahumada  et  al.  (2008),  even  the 
corrected values may not give a good approximation of the Spanish underground economy. In 
                                                 
5 Ahumada et al. (2007, 370) correct the estimate of Isachsen and Strom (1985, 24) for Norway, which is also 
based on the Klovland method and find that the corrected size of the underground economy is 1.51 percent of 
GDP in 1978, rather than 6.3 percent.  10 
 
this context it is worth noting again that the Ahumada et al. (2008, 2007) critique also applies 
to the results of Prado-Dominguez (2004), column P of Table 1, which are obtained by using 
the Tanzi version of currency demand method.   
To  summarize,  inspection  of  Table  1  shows  that  applying  the  Ahumada  et  al.  (2007) 
correction procedure leads to a substantial increase in the variability of the results. Given that 
these estimates are otherwise correct, the model specification seems to have a much larger 
impact than initially though. Yet, even the corrected values may still be faulty according to 
Ahumada  et  al.  (2008)  and  Breusch  (2005b,c).  In  any  case,  our  brief  review  of  existing 
estimates demonstrates that there is some faulty and mixed evidence concerning the size and 
evolution  of  the  underground  economy  in  Spain.  Possible  ways  of  addressing  this  issue 
include developing and applying alternative methods as well as conducting plausibility tests. 
Therefore, we proceed with applying the MCDR approach. 
 
2.3  The MCDR Approach 
The modified-cash-deposits-ratio (MCDR) approach was recently developed by Pickhardt and 
Sardà (2011) with a view to address various issues. First, to circumvent econometrical and 
mathematical  criticism  put  forward  by  Breusch  (2005,a,b,c,d)  and  Ahumada  et  al.  (2007, 
2008). Second, to include cash used in illicit economic activities, such as drug dealing, human 
trafficking, etc., that are not caused by tax pressure. Third, to simplify plausibility testing with 
respect  to  results  obtained  from  other  methods.  Fourth,  to  raise  the  level  of  transparency 
regarding the estimation procedure.  
Essentially, the MCDR approach is a modified version of the original Gutmann approach. 
Formal representations and critical reviews of Gutmann’s original approach are provided by 
Thomas  (1999,  F382–F383),  Feige  (1989,  36–44),  and  Blades  (1982,  43),  among  others. 
According to a central  assumption of the original Gutmann  approach,  agents in the legal 
economy wish to maintain a constant proportion l of cash holdings C and sight deposits D 11 
 
over  time.  However,  despite  some  country  specific  differences,  agents  in  industrialized 
countries apparently seem to have changed their preferences over time toward a substantially 
higher share of deposits. Thus, application of the original Gutmann  approach  would now 
generate negative values of the underground economy in many countries.  
Therefore,  Pickhardt  and  Sardà  (2011,  149–150)  assume  instead  that  “all  currency  in 
circulation in the base year, C0, represents the entire cash agents wish to hold in any year after 
the base year for the set of legal transactions they prefer to carry out in cash”. In addition, the 
authors assume that all additional transactions in the legal economy are carried out via sight 
deposits by using cheques, debit and credit cards, etc., but continue to apply the remaining 
assumptions  of  the  original  cash-deposit-ratio  approach.  Thus,  by  definition,  any  cash 
holdings  in  excess  of  those  in  the  base  year  can  be  fully  attributed  to  the  underground 
economy. Subject to these assumptions, Pickhardt and Sardà (2011, 150) show that using 
Irving Fisher’s (1911) quantity theory of money leads to: 
 









0 ,                    (4) 
 
with C0 = CLt, and Ct – C0  = CUt, t = 1, …, Z, and where Ct denotes currency in circulation 
outside banks at the end of the year, C0 denotes currency in circulation outside banks at the 
end  of  the  base  year  or  base  period,  here  1960,  CL  denotes  currency  used  for  legal 
transactions, CU  denotes currency used for underground economy transactions and Dt denotes 
sight deposits held by domestic non-banks (non-MFIs) at the end of the year.  
Although  this  modification  solves  the  major  problem  of  the  original  cash-deposit-ratio 
approach  (i.e.,  negative  results),  Pickhardt  and  Sardà  (2011,  150–156)  emphasize  that  all 
criticism put forward with respect to the original Gutmann approach applies to the modified 12 
 
version as well. This notwithstanding, they suggest and apply further auxiliary modifications 
that may to some extent address this criticism.  
In particular, these auxiliary modifications are (Pickhardt and Sardà 2011, 153): “1) that 
inflation may require increasing C0 over time to allow agents to carry out their preferred set of 
cash transactions, 2) that changes in the size of the population may require to adjust C0 over 
time, 3) that a certain fraction of Ct may be held abroad, 4) likewise, that a certain fraction of 
Ct may be hoarded by national agents, 5) that the number and set of transactions, which agents 
wish to carry out in cash, may change over time, for example, due to the evolution of new 
non-cash payment methods and facilities, 6) that some proceeds from underground activities 
may in fact be held as sight deposits, for example, because of money laundering or because 
the illegal transactions did not involve any cash payments at all, so that Dt may have to be 
reduced accordingly to DLt in the denominator of (4) and DUt may have to be added to CUt in 
the nominator, with Dt = DLt + DUt, 7) that the size of the underground economy may not have 
been close to zero in the base year or base period”.  
In  the  present  paper  we  have  addressed  the  first  two  modifications  (inflation  and 
population) and have forecasted Ct for the relevant period to bridge the gap caused by the 
Euro  introduction  (see  appendix).  Yet,  we  refrain  from  applying  the  third  auxiliary 
modification because we have no evidence that substantial amounts of Pesetas were held 
outside Spain during the period under consideration and we could not apply the remaining 
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Table 1: Size of the Spanish Underground Economy in Percent of GDP 











0.00  1960                        2.6
W       
3.06  1961                               
6.39  1962                               
7.75  1963                               
10.01  1964                18.21  3.60  5.86  6.46    13.82  0.43  3.26 
10.02  1965                17.91  3.7  5.6  6.14    14.05  0.39  3.06 
13.00  1966                17.56  3.8  6.0  6.18    14.28  0.45  3.08 
14.68  1967                16.65  3.8  5.6  5.90    14.28  0.39  2.91 
15.35  1968              1.7  16.03  3.0  4.5  5.05    12.40  0.26  2.39 
16.93  1969              1.6  15.15  3.0  4.1  4.58    12.40  0.21  2.12 
17.57  1970              1.8  15.58  3.03  4.57  4.40    12.48  0.26  2.02 
16.04  1971              2.6  14.19  2.6  3.6  3.85    11.39  0.17  1.71 
15.29  1972              3.9  12.99  2.3  3.4  3.59    10.59  0.15  1.56 
14.68  1973    12.3          4.5  12.69  2.3  3.5  3.45    10.59  0.16  1.49 
14.12  1974    12.6          4.2  13.16  2.3  3.2  3.34    10.59  0.13  1.43 
13.78  1975    14.4          5.3  12.61  2.85  3.67  3.70    12.03  0.17  1.62 
13.28  1976    15.3        8.8  7.6  12.37  3.0  3.8  3.73  1.0
M  12.40  0.19  1.64 
14.27  1977    16.5        10.3  8.7  13.06  3.8  5.8  3.92  6.5
W  14.28  0.42  1.74 
15.16  1978    17.6        11.7  10.6  13.31  4.0  6.5  4.32  22.9
L  14.72  0.52  1.97 
13.72  1979    18.5        13.0  12.1  13.82  4.9  7.0  5.80    16.61  0.60  2.85 
13.48  1980  3.7  17.9  15.5  11.69  11.69  14.0  15.1  14.26  6.34  7.28  5.85    19.36  0.65  2.88 
12.90  1981  5.2  17.9  16.7  12.25  12.50  15.4  18.1  14.33  5.7  6.4  5.89    18.17  0.51  2.90 
13.76  1982  6.8  17.1  16.3  12.68  12.69  15.2  20.4  14.96  5.3  5.6  5.63    17.40  0.39  2.74 
13.88  1983  9.1  17.1  16.5  13.40  13.94  16.1  22.6  15.50  6.0  7.5  6.80    18.74  0.69  3.47 
13.92  1984  10.7  16.2  16.7  12.32  14.17  15.3  24.2  16.15  8.3  8.3  7.39    22.73  0.83  3.85 
14.35  1985  13.0  15.7  17.2  11.67  14.93  14.9  27.2  16.91  8.94  9.50  8.45    23.76  1.08  4.56 
15.99  1986  14.6  15.5  18.7  9.51  15.84  15.4  28.7  17.34  9.6  8.5  7.98    24.79  0.87  4.24 
17.46  1987  16.9  15.7  18.5  13.96  17.02  15.9  28.7  17.59  14.5  14.3  10.41    31.68  2.37  5.91 
19.97  1988  18.5  15.7  18.4  13.94  17.11  15.7  26.4  18.40  15.8  16.7  11.44    33.34  3.20  6.65 
22.85  1989  20.8  15.9  18.9  17.85  18.27  16.5  24.9  19.86  19.2  21.6  13.69    37.44  5.25  8.33 
24.52  1990    16.2  19.8  17.92  18.13  17.2  24.5  19.50  16.1  16.5  12.46  16.1
I  33.72  3.13  7.40 
30.90  1991    16.7  19.9  18.31  18.32  18.0  24.2  21.05  15.6  16.5  13.64    33.09  3.13  8.29 
35.03  1992    18.0  19.4  19.62  18.99  19.0  26.8  24.75  20.02  18.88  15.42 
  38.39  4.05  9.66 
37.84  1993    18.4  20.1  19.61  18.35  18.9  28.7  25.38  21.6  20.1  14.15    40.16  4.57  8.68 
40.43  1994    17.8  20.2  18.49  18.38  17.8  32.5  25.58  19.9  17.0  13.97  22.3
R  38.25  3.31  8.54 
41.64  1995    16.4  20.1  17.31  17.91  16.8  31.2  26.92  18.92  17.36  14.13  22.4
I  37.12  3.45  8.66 
41.15  1996    16.8  20.0  16.69  17.76  16.1  30.9  26.33  18.3  17.4      36.39  3.46   
37.59  1997      20.1  18.05  18.40  15.9  30.9  24.29  18.4  17.5      36.51  3.50   
30.67  1998      21.2  17.92  18.62  15.3  29.4  21.79  18.91  16.79    23.1
I  37.11  3.23   
30.64  1999      20.7  18.73  19.22  15.5  28.7  19.15               
26.26  2000      20.9  19.03  19.25  15.9  26.2  18.46        22.7
I       
22.96  2001        19.22  18.97  16.4  25.7  17.75               
21.44  2002        20.16  19.22  18.2  26.3          22.5
I       
19.82  2003        20.05  19.24    26.4          22.2       
18.17  2004        20.85  19.54              21.9       
15.55  2005        22.64  20.26              21.3       
13.46  2006        24.46  20.86              20.2       
14.48  2007        26.37  21.23              19.3       
17.76  2008        21.29  18.47              18.7       
21.07  2009                        19.5       
  2010                        19.8       
Note:  All  values  show  the  size  of  the  Spanish  underground  economy  in  percent  of  legal  GDP 
according  to  the  various  authors,  except  in  column  year.  S2  represents  the  size  of  the  Spanish 
underground economy according to the MCDR approach, equation (5), own calculations. EM denotes 
values of Escobedo and Mauleón (1991, 119). MS denotes values of Mauleón and Sardà (1997, 128). 
GA denotes values of Gómez-Antonio and Alañón-Pardo (2004, 17). A+1 and A+2 denote values from 
Arrazola et al. (2011, 93), where A+1 refers to the currency demand model and A+2 to the electricity 
model. AG denotes values by Alañón-Pardo and Gómez-Antonio (2005, 1020). DGA denotes values of 
Dell’Anno et al. (2007, Table 6, 69, for years 1990, 1995, and 2000, with the remaining values read 
from Fig. 4, 68, which are, therefore, denoted in italics). P denotes values of Prado-Domínguez (2004, 
440). GS1 and GS2 denote values of Gadea and Serrano-Sanz (2002, for years 1964, 1970, 1975, 14 
 
1980, 1985, 1992, 1995 and 1998 from Table 4, 514, all other values are read from Figure 4, 515, 
with respect to DIR2 (GS1) and DIR2 with neither INNOV nor PDP variables (GS2). SE+ denotes 
values of Serrano-Sanz et al. (1998, 32). Var. denotes values by various authors: W denotes values of 
Weck-Hannemann et al. (1984), cf. Schneider (1997a, 43; 1997b, 140), where 6.5 actually refers to 
1978, M denotes Moltó Calvo (1980, 51), L denotes Lafuente Félez (1980, 590), R denotes Schneider 
(1997b, 149), I denotes Feld and Schneider (2010, 134), where the values represent the average 
between the selected year and the previous one, and with respect to 2003 to 2010 values are taken 
from Schneider (2010, 3)). A-GS1, A-GS2 and A-SE+ denote the Ahumada et al. (2007) correction 
applied to the values of GS1, GS2 and SE+, respectively (own calculations).Underlined numbers 






Figure 1: Size of the Underground Economy in Spain (S2) and Germany (G3) in 
Percent of GDP based on MCDR approach 
 
Note: S2 profile, own calculations. G3 profile obtained from Pickhardt and Sardà (2011, 151-
152).  
 
where  FC  denotes  forecasted  currency  in  circulation  outside  banks  and  PIC0  denotes 
population and inflation adjusted values of C0. Hence, according to (5) it is assumed that on 
average agents wish to hold a constant real currency budget to carry out their preferred set of 15 
 
legal transactions in cash. Of course, the qualifications made by Pickhardt and Sardà (2011, 
155–156) with respect to this notion, the changes in the statistics of sight deposits due to the 
Euro introduction and regarding the base year apply here as well. Then, application of (5) to 
the Spanish data set yields the size of the Spanish underground economy according to the 
MCDR approach, which is displayed in column S2 of Table 1. In Figure 1 we display and 
contrast the Spanish underground economy profile S2 with the German underground economy 
profile G3, which Pickhardt and Sarda (2011) have calculated using the MCDR approach.
6 
Although the same  approach and the same period have been used the  two profiles differ 
remarkably, with the German profile being always below the Spanish one.   
To  summarize,  by  applying  the  MCDR  approach  to  Spain  we  obtained  underground 
economy  profile  S2.  Yet,  despite  the  fact  that  additional  modifications  are  considered 
necessary, relevant data is currently unavailable so that further quantitative adjustments are 
impossible. Moreover, because these additional adjustments may have different signs, the sign 
of the net effect is unpredictable. Therefore, the S2 profile may represent a lower or upper 
bound of the size of the cash using section of the Spanish underground economy, or may even 
represent a rough estimate of its true size in case possible other influences balance. 
 
3  Causes of the Spanish Underground Economy 
As  noted  elsewhere,  an  inconvenience  of  the  MCDR  approach  is  its  inability  to  explain 
possible  causes  of  the  underground  economy.  To  address  this  issue,  we  now  extend  the 
MCDR  approach  by  exposing  the  S2  profile  to  an  econometrical  estimation  procedure. 
However, we first use a simple correlations test to further examine the profiles of the Spanish 
underground economy, as summarized in Table 1.  
                                                 
6 Given some Deutsch-Mark specific circumstances the German G3 profile, rather than the G2 profile, should be 
compared  with  the  Spanish  S2  profile.  Also,  in  Table  1  we  directly  display  the  S2  profile,  but  not  the 
corresponding auxiliary profiles S0, S0_2, S1, as in Pickhardt and Sardà (2011, 151, Table 2, l.h.s.). Moreover, 
as noted in Pickhardt and Sardà (2011), during the period 1987 to 1991 the G3 profile is not entirely attributable 
to the underground economy.  16 
 
3.1   Simple Correlations  
Inspection  of  Table  1  shows  that  the  MCDR  approach  allows  for  obtaining  the  largest 
available times series regarding the size of the Spanish underground economy. Moreover, the 
peak of the S2 profile and various values of the S2 profile by and large coincide with those 
obtained  by  several  other  researchers  using  different  methods.  In  fact,  this  observation  is 
confirmed by the correlation coefficients shown in Table 2 with respect to S2 and some other 
profiles  of  the  Spanish  underground  economy,  in  particular,  the  one  obtained  by  Prado-
Dominguez  (2004)  and  the  Ahumada  et  al.  corrected  values  of  Gadea  and  Serrano-Sanz 
(2002), Tables 1 and 2, columns P and A-GS1, respectively.  
Yet, the prime purpose of the correlations test shown in Table 2 is to further investigate the 
assertion of section 2.1 that the Escobedo and Mauleón (1991) method necessarily mimics the 
evolution of the tax pressure variable over time. Inspection of Table 2, columns EM and A+2, 
reveal that these two profiles almost exactly match the profile of the TTOT variable (total 
taxes over GDP) , with R
2 = 0.99. Hence, we can safely rule out that these two profiles, EM 
and A+2, represent the evolution of the Spanish underground economy during the relevant 
period of time.  
Essentially the same is true for the remaining three profiles that rest on the Escobedo and 
Mauleón (1991) method, which are profiles MS, GA, and A+1 of Table 1. However, in two of 
these cases, GA and A+1, Table 2 cannot give a clear cut result because the profiles are not 
obtained from a single fiscal pressure variable. In the case of GA it is a relative pressure 
variable composed of the marginal over the average total tax rate and in the case of A+1 it is a 
combination of two variables, total taxes over GDP (TTOT) plus a variable that captures the 
fiscal structure, i.e., the percentage of indirect taxes over total taxes. Regarding the case of 
MS, it is actually a single tax pressure variable, the average value of social security payments, 
but there are obviously differences in the data set with respect to the variable TCSS (social 
security contributions over GDP). Arrazola et al. (2011, 33) support this view because in their 17 
 
own model specifications the variable TCSS is never statistically significant. Yet, with R
2 = 
0.67, the variable TCSS is still more correlated with the MS profile than any other variable 
listed in Table 2.  
Furthermore, in the case of EM the authors claim that they have used two tax pressure 
variables in their estimation procedure, indirect taxes over GDP (TIND) and direct taxes over 
GDP (TDIR). Yet, results of the correlations test in Table 2 suggest that either the variable 
direct taxes includes social security taxes (TCSS), so that TIND + (TDIR + TCSS) = TTOT 
holds, or that effectively the TTOT variable was used. To this extent the correlations test not 
only supports our claim that the Escobedo and Mauleón (1991) method is unsuitable for an 
analysis of the evolution of the underground economy, but it also reveals some irregularities 
with respect to the EM and MS profiles shown in Table 1. This notwithstanding, the Escobedo 
and Mauleón (1991) method may still be useful for obtaining a single value of the size of the 
underground economy in a specific year, which may then be used for calibrating a MIMIC 
index as in Alañón-Pardo and Gómez-Antonio (2005), for example.  
Finally, it is worth noting that all profiles of the Spanish underground economy shown in 
Table 2 are highly correlated with just a single tax pressure variable, except profiles P and S2. 
In particular, the profiles MS and AG show the highest correlation with the TCSS variable, 
profiles A+1, GS1, GS2, and SE+ with the TDIR variable, none of the profiles with the TIND 
variable and the profiles EM, GA, A+2, and DGA with the TTOT variable. Therefore, it 
seems that these underground economy profiles mimic the profiles of a tax pressure variable 
to a large extent and, thus, may not provide reliable evidence with respect to the evolution of 
the Spanish underground economy. In this context it is also worth noting that the S2 profile is 
not even moderately correlated with any of the variables, FC (R
2 = 0.32), PIC (R
2 = 0.25) or D 
(R
2 = 0.05), which were used according to (5) for calculating the S2 profile.  Table 2: Correlation Coefficients 




A+2  AG  DGA  P  GS1  GS2  SE+  A-GS1  A-GS2  A-SE+ 
S2  1.0000  0.8964  0.3266  0.8188  0.2124  0.3657  0.5962  0.6548  0.9033  0.8726  0.8297  0.8380  0.8455  0.8374  0.8541 
R
2  1.00  0.80  0.11  0.67  0.05  0.13  0.36  0.43  0.82  0.76  0.69  0.70  0.71  0.70  0.73 
                               
GDPR  0.4901  0.9531  0.3923  0.9192  0.8959  0.8244  0.5630  0.7881  0.5949  0.8874  0.8530  0.7933  0.8908  0.8301  0.8001 
R
2  0.24  0.91  0.15  0.84  0.80  0.68  0.32  0.62  0.35  0.79  0.73  0.63  0.79  0.69  0.64 
CF  0.6731  0.9809  0.4770  0.9442  0.7442  0.9542  0.5997  0.8099  0.9079  0.8494  0.8126  0.7429  0.8662  0.7744  0.7432 
R
2  0.45  0.96  0.23  0.89  0.55  0.91  0.36  0.66  0.82  0.72  0.66  0.55  0.75  0.60  0.55 
TCSS  0.4513  -0.1204  0.8194  0.6041  0.7972  0.6968  0.8993  0.9051  0.4603  0.7022  0.6803  0.6223  0.7307  0.6302  0.6182 
R
2  0.20  0.01  0.67  0.36  0.64  0.49  0.81  0.82  0.21  0.49  0.46  0.39  0.53  0.40  0.38 
TDIR  0.5168  0.9383  0.4099  0.9110  0.9550  0.9670  0.8177  0.9218  0.7628  0.9617  0.9563  0.9390  0.9734  0.9252  0.9365 
R
2  0.27  0.88  0.17  0.83  0.91  0.94  0.67  0.85  0.58  0.92  0.91  0.88  0.95  0.86  0.88 
TIND  0.6013  0.9570  0.1424  0.8945  0.6096  0.9086  0.7290  0.8532  0.7940  0.9148  0.8996  0.9126  0.9208  0.8698  0.9063 
R
2  0.36  0.92  0.02  0.80  0.37  0.82  0.53  0.73  0.63  0.84  0.81  0.83  0.85  0.76  0.82 
TTOT  0.5559  0.9955  0.4389  0.9490  0.8855  0.9999  0.8383  0.9529  0.7257  0.9374  0.9217  0.9005  0.9546  0.8811  0.8960 
R
2  0.31  0.99  0.19  0.90  0.78  0.99  0.70  0.91  0.53  0.88  0.85  0.81  0.91  0.78  0.80 
ID  0.6775  0.5202  0.3950  0.8085  0.7882  0.8031  0.6213  0.7432  0.8171  0.8709  0.8196  0.8345  0.8535  0.8170  0.8463 
R
2  0.46  0.27  0.16  0.65  0.62  0.65  0.39  0.55  0.67  0.76  0.67  0.70  0.73  0.67  0.72 
ISE  -0.569  -0.154  -0.696  -0.809  0.055  -0.192  -0.814  -0.938  -0.516  -0.759  -0.725  -0.657  -0.788  -0.670  -0.664 
R
2  0.32  0.02  0.49  0.65  0.00  0.04  0.66  0.88  0.27  0.58  0.53  0.43  0.62  0.45  0.44 
IU  0.6946  0.8053  0.4323  0.6439  0.7589  0.9744  0.7510  -0.165  0.0985  0.8937  0.8524  0.8339  0.9159  0.8006  0.8256 
R
2  0.48  0.65  0.19  0.42  0.58  0.95  0.56  0.03  0.01  0.80  0.73  0.70  0.84  0.64  0.68 
UR  0.7127  0.6717  0.4465  0.3323  -0.534  -0.285  0.7025  0.9408  0.6845  0.8460  0.8063  0.7868  0.8754  0.7479  0.7761 
R
2  0.51  0.45  0.20  0.11  0.29  0.08  0.49  0.89  0.47  0.72  0.65  0.62  0.77  0.56  0.60 
CL  0.4605  0.9573  0.0717  0.6518  0.6455  0.9114  0.6654  0.2787  0.6646  0.8290  0.8268  0.8047  0.8580  0.7718  0.7897 
R
2  0.21  0.92  0.01  0.43  0.42  0.83  0.44  0.08  0.44  0.69  0.68  0.65  0.74  0.60  0.62 
                               
Note: all values own calculations, columns S2 trough A-SE+ correspond to the underground economy profiles shown in Table 1. GDPR denotes real GDP, CF 
denotes overall factor competitiveness, TCSS denotes social security contributions over GDP, TDIR denotes direct taxes over GDP, TIND denotes indirect taxes 
over GDP, TTOT denotes total tax revenue over GDP, ID denotes the index of drug crime related prisoner, ISE denotes index of self employed people, IU denote 
the index  of unemployment,  UR  denotes  the  unemployment rate,  CL  denotes  labor  force  competitiveness  and  R
2  denotes the coefficient  of  determination. 
underlined R
2 values denote peak values in the relevant column. 3.2   Econometric Estimations 
To  proceed,  we  now  extend  the  MCDR  approach  by  exposing  the  S2  profile  to  an  OLS 
estimation  procedure.  In  particular,  we  use  the  S2  profile  as  the  dependent  variable  and 
choose the following explanatory variables.  
The first class of variables which we select includes real gross domestic product (GDPR) 
and overall factor competitiveness (CF), to capture the macroeconomic performance of the 
economy. The expected sign of the variable GDPR is difficult to predict and might depend on 
both  the  structure  and  development  stage  of  the  legal  and  underground  economy  under 
consideration  (e.g.  see  Schneider  and  Enste  2000;  Serrano-Sanz  and  Gadea  2005,  146). 
However, in developed countries a negative sign of this variable is more likely. In contrast, an 
increase  in  overall  factor  competitiveness  is  expected  to  the  lead  ceteris  paribus  to  less 
underground activities, so that a negative sign is expected here.  
The  second  class  of  variables  deals  with  tax  pressure  and  we  consider  here  just  one 
variable, total tax revenue over GDP (TTOT). As noted, this is a frequently selected variable 
in underground economy estimation procedures and conventionally the expected sign is a 
positive one.  
The third class of variables is devoted to criminal activities. We consider an index that 
measures the normalized number of drug crime related prisoners (ID), with a view to capture 
the most cash intensive crime activities. Unfortunately, however, we were unable to obtain 
other crime related data for a sufficiently long time series and, thus, the variable ID is the only 
crime related variable we can currently include.  
The last class of variables we consider is related to the labor market. First, we include an 
index of self-employed people (ISE), to capture those who have more options with respect to 
underground economy engagements and tax evasion (positive sign expected). Next we use an 
index of unemployment (IU), which measures the absolute change in unemployment (positive 
sign expected). In addition, we include the unemployment rate (UR) with a view to address a 20 
 
relative measure of unemployment. As argued by Alañón-Pardo and Gómez-Antonio (2005, 
1014)  and  others  the  relationship  between  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  underground 
economy is somewhat ambiguous and, therefore, the sign of the variable is hard to predict. 
Lastly, labor force competiveness (CL) is considered (negative sign expected) with a view to 
capture the international productivity of the national labor force.  
Following Serrano-Sanz et al. (1998, 27–28) and Prado-Domínguez (2004, 450), we also 
use a dummy variable (F), which is designed to capture changes in the Spanish fiscal system. 
In particular, this dummy equals zero from 1970 to 1984, one from 1985 to 1987, two from 
1988 to 1990 and three from 1991 onwards. Moreover, we use a deterministic time trend. 
Data is available for all variables just for the period 1970 to 2009 and, therefore, we can 
expose the S2 profile only during this limited period to some estimation procedures. Subject 
to the limitations mentioned so far, we use the Engle-Granger error correction procedure and 
obtain  four  different  models,  which  are  presented  in  Table  3.  All  estimations  have  been 
carried out with the EViews software package.  
 
3.3 Discussion 
Inspection of Table 3 shows that all four models pass the diagnostic statistics for normality 
c
2
Norm(2), no residual serial correlation c
2





Hetero(1) and no misspecification c
2
RESET(1). To ensure that there is no 
misspecification due to parameter instability, we have carried out a CUSUM test (results not 
displayed) and a CUSUM of squares test (see appendix Fig. 3). Both tests indicate the absence 
of parameter instability because the test statistics are within the five percent critical bounds.  
Moreover, according to the adjusted coefficient of determination (adj. R
2) the four models 
fit the data reasonable well, with Model 1 (2, 3, 4) explaining about 75 (70, 66, 76) percent of 
the variations in the S2 profile, respectively.  
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Table 3: Estimation Results for S2 Regressions (1970 to 2009) 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
Variable  LR  SR    LR  SR    LR  SR    LR  SR 
C  --  -10.71  
(-4.93)
*** 
  -98.24 
(-2.43)
** 
--    --  --    --  -9.00 
(-4.71)
*** 
  DS2t-1  --  0.62 
(3.69)
 *** 
  --  0.45 
(3.15)
 *** 
  --  0.39 
(2.63)
** 
  --  0.80 
(4.70)
*** 
DS2t-2  --  0.64 
(2.94)
 *** 




  --  0.41 
(2.68)
** 
  --  0.47 
(2.79)
** 
GDP  -1.07E-15 
 (-2.06)
** 
--    -1.99E-15 
(-8.24)
 *** 




DGDP  --  --    --  3.33E-16 
(2.01)
* 
  --  --    --  -- 
DGDPt-1  --  1.46E-15 
(2.73)
** 
  --  --    --  --    --  1.21E-15 
(2.64)
** 
DGDPt-2  --  1.64E-15 
(4.19)
 *** 
  --  --    --  --    --  9.39E-16 
(2.87)
*** 
CF  -2.16 
(-4.95)
 *** 
--    --  --    -0.73 
(-4.17)
 *** 




DCF  --  --    --  --    --  --    --  -0.94 
(-2.60)
** 
TTOT  2.02 
(4.86)
 *** 
--    0.82 
(1.87)
* 
--    2.26 
(5.07)
 *** 




DTTOT  --  2.22 
(4.74)
 *** 
  --  --    --  --    --  0.79 
(2.59)
** 
DTTOTt-1  --  --    --  --    --  -0.58 
(-2.05)
* 
  --  -- 
DTTOTt-2  --  --    --  0.89 
(2.72)
** 
  --  0.66 
(2.24)
** 
  --  0.76 
(2.14)
** 
ID  0.05 
(4.33)
 *** 
--    0.06 
(5.52)
 *** 
--    0.07 
(5.58)
 *** 




DID  --  --    --  --    --  0.02 
(2.36)
** 





DIDt-1  --  -0.04 
(-5.60)
 *** 
  --  -0.03 
(-4.29)
 *** 
  --  -0.02 
(-3.88)
 *** 
  --  -0.04 
(-4.76)
*** 
ISE  98,72 
(4.23)
 *** 
--    76.89 
(2.61)
** 




DISEt-1  --  -70.87 
(-3.67)
 *** 
  --  -40.63 
(-2.98)
 *** 
  --  --    --  -90.34 
(4.17)
*** 
DISEt-2  --  -30.23 
(-2.17)
** 
  --  --    --  --    --  -41.85 
(-2.63)
** 
IU  4.78 
(4.95)
 *** 
--    3.44 
(3.07)
 *** 
--    5.53 
(4.76)
 *** 
--    --  -- 
DIU  --  3.06 
(4.34)
 *** 




  --  1.71 
(2.58)
** 
  --  -- 
DIUt-1  --  -2.54 
(-3.14)
 *** 
  --  -0.55 
(-2.25)
** 
  --  -2.24 
(-2.57)
** 
  --  -- 
DIUt-2  --  -3.67 
(-2.97)
 *** 
  --  --    --  --    --  -- 
UR  -4.69 
(-5.35)
 *** 
--    -3.86 
(-3.65)
 *** 
--    -4.75 
(-4.50)
 *** 




DUR  --  -2.09 
(-3.30)
 *** 
  --  --    --  -1.32 
(-2.10)
** 
  --  -- 
DURt-1  --  2.14 
(2.87)
 *** 
  --  --    --  1.65 
(2.21)
** 
  --  -- 
DURt-2  --  3.58 
(3.24)
 *** 
  --  --    --  --    --  -- 
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Table 3: continued 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
Variable  LR  SR    LR  SR    LR  SR    LR  SR 





  3.54 
(4.11)
 *** 
--    3.72 
(5.05)
 *** 




DCL  --  1.61 
(2.59)
** 
  --  --    --  --    --  2.65 
(3.46)
*** 
DCLt-2  --  -- 
 
  --  -1.33 
(-3.37)
 *** 
  --  --    --  -- 
F  .--  1.75 
(4.70)
 *** 
  --  --    --  --    --  1.31 
(4.20)
*** 
Trend  -3.29 
(-2.43)
** 
--    --  --    -5.02 
(-8.11)
 *** 
--    --  -- 
ECt-1  --  -0.93 
(-5.95)
 *** 
  --  -0.24 
(-2.69)
** 
  --  -0.41 
(-3.63)
 *** 
  --  -0.87 
(-4.67)
*** 
Diagnostics                       
adj. R
2  0.89  0.75    0.84  0.70    0.84  0.66    0.82  0.76 
s.e.  3.00  1.26    3.64  1.38    3.68  1.45    3.90  1.24 
AIC  --  3.60    --  3.69    --  3.81    --  3.54 
SBC  --  4.37    --  4.12    --  4.28    --  4.18 
χ
2
NORM(2)  --  0.01 
[0.99] 
  --  0.04 
[0.98] 
  --  1.56 
[0.46] 




SC(2)  --  2.77 
[0.25] 
  --  2.15 
[0.34] 
  --  1.10 
[0.58] 




ARCH(1)  --  0.20 
[0.66] 
  --  0.69 
[0.40] 
  --  0.10 
[0.76] 




HETERO(1)  --  38.58 
[0.27] 
  --  13.39 
[0.86] 
  --  19.78 
[0.60] 




RESET(1)  --  0.24 
[0.62] 
  --  2.44 
[0.12] 
  --  0.09 
[0.77] 
  --  0.03 
[0.87] 
Note: Own calculations, t-statistics are given in parenthesis, * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance on the 1% level. LR 
denotes long run, SR denotes short run, C denotes constant, D denotes first differences, F denotes a 
dummy variable, Trend denotes a deterministic time trend, EC denotes error correction term, s.e. 
denotes standard error, AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion, SBC denotes Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion,  values  in  square  brackets  denote  probability.  An  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test  and  a 
Phillips-Perron test show that all variables are integrated of order one I(1), although evidence for the 
variable IU is rather weak. The residuals of the long-run etimations in all four models are I(0) at the 
one  percent  level  of  significance  and,  thus,  we  can  reject  the  null  that  the  variables  are  not 
cointegrated. 
 
Bearing  in  mind  that  the  MCDR  approach  covers  the  entire  cash  using  section  of  the 
underground economy and that due to missing data we were unable to include more than one 
crime related variable, the closeness of fit might be even better if more crime related variables 
could be included. The error corrections terms (ECt-1) have the expected negative sign and are 23 
 
statistically significant at the one percent level  (Models 1, 3 and 4) or five percent level 
(Model 2), which confirms that the variables are cointegrated. However, the coefficients of 
the error correction terms indicate that the adjustment of the Spanish underground economy to 
shocks depends heavily on the model specification. In fact, results of Table 3 seem to suggest 
that the inclusion or not of labor market variables, macro variables and the dummy F account 
for these differences. Results for Model 1, where all variables are included, indicate that about 
93 percent of a shock is absorbed already in the first year, whereas in Model 4 it is 88 percent, 
in Model 3 only 41 percent and just 24 percent in the case of Model 2.  
Further inspection of Table 3 with respect to the four classes of variables and their long run 
results reveals the following. Regarding the first class, Table 3 shows that the macroeconomic 
variables, GDP and overall factor competitiveness (CF), have a statistically significant and 
negative influence on the Spanish underground economy in the long run in all four models. 
This  result  not  only  coincides  with  conventional  expectations,  but  it  also  indicates  that  a 
growth and competitiveness orientated economy policy would automatically help to curb the 
underground economy in Spain. In this context is worth noting that neither this result nor the 
policy recommendation can be derived from the approaches listed in Table 1, r.h.s., except in 
the case of Dell’Anno et al. (2007, 73), who explicitly recommend a growth orientated policy. 
Next,  we  consider  the  class  of  tax  pressure  variables,  which  contains  only  the  TTOT 
variable. In the long run, this variable has a positive influence and is statistically significant at 
the one percent level, except in Models 2 and 4 where it is significant at the 10 percent level. 
This clearly indicates that in the long run higher tax pressure leads to more underground 
economy activities. In one way or another, this result is obtained by all studies on the Spanish 
underground economy mentioned in Table 1, r.h.s. Yet, it must be emphasized again that in 
all of these studies, except in the cases based on the MIMIC approach, tax pressure is the only 
explanatory variable, whereas in Models 1 to 4 tax pressure is only one of several explanatory 24 
 
variables. This notwithstanding, according to our four models any economic policy approach 
leading to less tax pressure would help to curb the Spanish underground economy.  
Regarding the class of criminal activities, which again contains just one variable, ID, all 
four models indicate that this variable has a positive sign and that it is highly significant in the 
long run. These findings support the view expressed by Pickhardt and Sardà (2011) that the 
MCDR approach covers all cash using sections of the underground economy and not just the 
share induced by excessive taxation. In fact, it is the first time that evidence on the influence 
of drug related criminal activity is obtained in a study on the Spanish underground economy. 
The policy implication of this finding clearly points to an intensified combat against drug 
related crime and the use of drugs in general.  
As noted, the labor market class includes four variables, the index of self-employed (ISE), 
the index of unemployment (IU), the unemployment rate (UR), and the competitiveness of 
labor (CL). According to Table 3 all of them are statistically significant in the long run in all 
four models, except the variable ISE which is not included in Model 3 and the variable IU 
which is not included in Model 4. Moreover, the variables ISE and IU have the expected 
positive  sign  in  all  models.  This  indicates  that  increasing  numbers  of  self-employed  and 
unemployed  people  would  lead  to  more  underground  economy  activities.  In  fact,  these 
findings are supported by several other studies on the Spanish underground economy, for 
example,  by  Ahn  and  de  la  Rica  (1997)  and  Alba-Ramirez  (1994),  and  by  Bargain  and 
Kwenda (2011) for other countries.  
Yet, as mentioned above, with respect to UR there is no clear cut theoretical prediction of 
the sign and, in fact, some studies have found a negative sign (i.e. Alañon-Prado and Gómez-
Antonio 2005, 1018; Arrazola et al. 2011, 79), while others have found a positive relation (i.e. 
Dell’Anno  et  al.  2007,  77;  Feld  and  Schneider  2010,  130).  For  example,  based  on  their 
finding of a negative sign, Alañon-Prado and  Gómez-Antonio (2005,  1017) state that  “in 
Spain higher unemployment rates do not necessarily go hand in hand with increases in the 25 
 
shadow  economy”.  In  fact,  mixed  results  with  respect  to  the  sign  may  point  to  a  more 
complex  interaction  between  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  underground  economy.  But 
subject to the results obtained for the variable IU, we still think that there is evidence that 
more unemployment increases the demand for jobs in the underground economy, which may 
eventually lead to an increase in underground economy activities.   
 Regarding the variable CL we find an unexpected positive sign and we have been unable 
to trace any other study taking this variable into account. However, the work of Ahn and de la 
Rica (1997) indicates that the Spanish labor market is rather divided in the sense that a higher 
proportion of those with lower education and skills work underground, as compared to those 
with  higher  education  levels  and  skills.  Hence,  ceteris  paribus  increased  labor 
competitiveness might imply that those at the lower end of the legal market are pushed into 
the underground section. In any case, Table 3 indicates that labor market aspects might well 
be the main driving force of the underground economy in Spain. To this extent, the policy 
conclusion is that labor market reforms which lead to more employment in large or medium 
sized, internationally competitive firms would contribute to a substantial reduction in the size 
of the Spanish underground economy. 
In summarizing, the overall policy conclusion that emerges from our findings is a growth 
and factor competiveness orientated macro policy that leads to more exports, combined with a 
fundamental  labor  market  reform  that  aims  at  increasing  the  Spanish  innovation  and 
competitiveness capacities at the international level. For example, by allowing more young 
people  to  enter  the  labor  market  and  by  increasing  relevant  skills,  such  as  advanced 
knowledge of languages, in the  existing labor force. Moreover, the fight against criminal 
activities, especially drug related crime, should be intensified. Our findings also suggest that 
these policy reforms should be accompanied by less tax pressure, which might be achieved, 
for example, by tax cuts and by shifting some public labor force from less to more policy 
relevant departments. Yet, our results also indicate that even revenue neutral changes in the 26 
 
Spanish tax structure, leading to a lower social security tax burden, may ceteris paribus help 
to  curb  the  underground  economy.  Moreover,  since  tax  pressure  is  clearly  not  the  main 
driving force of the Spanish underground economy, moderate tax increases to finance the 
policy reforms mentioned above might be tolerable for a limited time.   
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we present the most comprehensive review of available estimates of the Spanish 
underground economy ever conducted. It turns out, however, that most of these estimates are 
untenable with respect to either the evolution or the size of the latter or both. By applying the 
correction procedure suggested by Ahumada et al. (2007), we were able to correct some of 
these estimates. Yet, the large spread of the corrected values, together with the rather small 
differences in the underlying estimation equations and the critique of Breusch (2005c) and 
Ahumada et al. (2008), suggest that the currency demand method is very sensible to the model 
specification. Hence, results obtained from this method should be used with great care only, if 
at all.  
Given these findings we applied the MCDR approach to the Spanish data set and obtained 
the largest available time series regarding the size and evolution of the Spanish underground 
economy.  Although  this  approach  is  not  subject  to  the  aforementioned  critique,  a  major 
disadvantage  is  its  inability  to  explain  possible  causes  of  the  underground  economy. 
Therefore,  we  further  developed  the  MCDR  approach  by  exposing  the  S2  profile  of  the 
Spanish  underground  economy  to  an  econometric  estimation  procedure.  The  estimation 
results clearly indicate that the S2 profile is not predominantly caused by tax pressure, but by 
labor  market  aspects.  Moreover,  macroeconomic  influences  and  drug  related  criminal 
activities  also  play  a  role.  Based  on  these  findings  we  were  able  to  propose  some 
comprehensive economic policy measures to combat the underground economy in Spain.  27 
 
Finally, the application of the MCDR approach to the Spanish case and the econometric 
estimation of the Spanish underground economy profile S2 show that the MCDR approach 
may  in  fact  have  some  appealing  features  regarding  the  macro  analysis  of  cash  using 
underground economy activities. Yet, the MCDR approach is just a first attempt to deal with 
the criticism put forward against the traditional monetary methods.  
 
Appendix 
A) Data Sources 
Data on currency in circulation outside banks (Efectivo en manos del público): end of year 
data listed in Anuario Estadístico de España, scanned printed matter, published for various 
years by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Sight deposits: end of year data for 1962 to 
2010 obtained from Banco de España (series BE040504) and for years 1960 and 1961 from 
Anuario Estadístico de España (1965, 236), published by Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
Consumer  price  index  (2005  =  100),  (series  18464ZF),  was  collected  from  International 
Financial  Statistics  (IFS)  online.  Data  on  population  was  collected  from  International 
Financial Statistics online (series 18499ZZF, 1960-2009) and Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
for 2000–2010, estimates by INE and official figures from the annual review of the municipal 
census,  for  January  1  of  each  year.  Nominal  GDP  was  collected  from  the  IFS  (series 
18499BCZW) and the GDP Deflator (2005 = 100) from the IFS (series 18499BIRZF). ID is 
the index of population in prison for crimes against public health at the end of the year (1964 
= 1), data collected from Anuario Estadístico del Ministerio de Interior. IU (1964 = 1) was 
obtained from   OECD Statistical compendium (series ESP4050) and UR was obtained from  
OECD  Statistical  compendium  (series  ESP4051),  except  for  years  1977,  2000  and  2001, 
which are taken from INE (EPA - Encuesta de Población Activa - of the corresponding year). 
TTOT was collected from OECD Statistical compendium (series 32A3TOTAT). ISE (1964 = 
1) was obtained from OECD Statistical compendium (series ESP4042). CF (1995 = 100) was 
collected from the Banco de España (series SI_1_4_6 745874) and CL from Banco de España 
(series SI_1_4_5 745873). 
 
B) Euro Introduction 
To deal with the Euro introduction and the associated changes of currency in circulation and 
sight deposits, we have used an exponential interpolation in the following way. First, we have 28 
 
chosen some years before and after the drop of the series, that is, 1995 through 1999 and 
2006.  Second,  by  inspection  of  the  data  we  decided  that  an  exponential  function  would 
produce the best fit, and, thus, we used C = e
(a + b t), where C denotes currency in circulation 
outside banks and t denotes time, where 1995=1, 1996=2, ..., 2006=12. Third, by using an 
OLS estimation procedure, we obtained,  
 
Ln Ct = 24.5618109 + 0.01999468* t, 
             (896.6)           (4.2) 
 
where  relevant  t-statistics  are  given  in  parenthesis  below  the  coefficients  and  diagnostic 
statistics  are:  Adj.  R
2  =  0.77,  standard  error  =  0.0419.  Taking  natural  logarithms,  we 
calculated parameters a and b: 
 
Ct = e
24.5618 + 0.1999t. 
 
Third, if the expression above is given, interpolation between 2000 and 2006 yields the results 
shown in Figure 2, where FC denotes forecasted C, which we used in equation (5) of the main 
text.  
 



































C)  Test Statistics 
Figure 3a,b,c,d: CUSUM Test of Squares 
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